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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY,

a municipal
corporation of the State of
Utah,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No. 14818

vs.
RAYMOND S. SHUEY,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT

NATURE OF CASE
The City of Salt Lake is appealing an adverse
Order of the District Court of the Third Judicial Dsitrict
in and for Salt Lake County.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court found for the defendant and
held that the presumption rule upon which the City of
Salt Lake relied in its conviction of the defendant was
invalid.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant-respondent herein named was convicted in Salt Lake City Court for violating the Salt Lake
City Revised Ordinance, Section 156.

The defendant appealed
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said conviction in the District Court of the Third Judicial
District in and for Salt Lake County.

Said appeal was

taken on stipulated facts, reserving to the Court a
determination of the issue of law regarding the use of
the alleged common-law presumption rule by the City.
The rule of presumption, as used by the City
of Salt Lake, is that a registered owner of an automobile
is presumed to have parked said automobile, and further,
that said presumption constitutes prima facie evidence
that the person in whose name such vehicle is registered
as owner, committed or authorized the commission of such
violation.

A similar presumption was previously codified

as Salt Lake City Revised Ordinance, §46-8-170, and, in
1973, was repealed.
The District Court reversed the decision of the
City Court, found the defendant not guilty as charged, and
held that the City of Salt Lake had no legal power to
employ a common-law rule of presumption in the determination
of defendant's guilt.
Prior to April of 1973, the City of Salt Lake
enacted an ordinance enabling the City to use as prima
facie evidence the presumption that the registered owner
of a vehicle committed or authorized the commission of a
parking violation.
§46-8-170.

Salt Lake City Revised Ordinances,

In 1952, the Utah Court held that the power

to pass an ordinance establishing a rule of evidence
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·
binding
o n the courts is not granted to cities expressly
bY statute and is not fairly implicable from or incident
to powers expressly given cities.
12 2 utah 344, 249 P.2d 507 (1952).

Nasf'ell v. Ogden,
See also Walton v.

Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724 (1939);
Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161
(1933); and, Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 61 Utah 533, 216
p.234 (1923).
Subsequently, in 1973, the City of Salt Lake
repealed the offending portion of the ordinance which
authorized the use of the presumption rule, but since the
repeal, has been using a common-law presumption which
closely parallels the repealed ordinance.
Although the Nasfell decision explicitly
addressed itself to the validity of a codified presumption
rule, by negative implication it also addressed itself to
the issue of the existence of a similar common-law
presumption rule.

Inasmuch as the Nasfell court made

no mention of a common-law presumption, it chose to give
no legal vitality and no judicial recognition to a commonlaw presumption.

Hence, the Nasfell decision held, albeit

implicitly, that there was no common-law presumption rule
which us under attack in the case at bar.
Even if the court finds that Nasfell, supra,
is not controlling and that there is in existence a commonlaw presumption rule, the rule is invalid.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT I

IN UTAH, THERE IS NO VALID COMMON-LAW PRESUMPTION
THAT THE REGISTERED OWNER OF A MOTOR VEHICLE WAS IN CONTROL
OF THE VEHICLE AT THE TIME IT WAS ILLEGALLY PARKED BECAUSE
THERE IS NO RATIONAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE FACTS PROVED
AND THE ULTIMATE FACT PRESUMED.
ARGUMENT

The judiciary cannot assert the existence of a
common-law presumption if there is no rational connection
between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed.
"A presumption upon a matter of fact, when it
is not merely a disguise for some other principle, means
that common experience shows the fact to be so generally
true that courts may notice the truth."
States, 245 U.S. 559, 561 (1918).

Greer v. united

More recently, the United

States Supreme Court in Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463
(1943), laid out a test to apply when considering the
validity of a presumption.

That is, there must be a

rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate
fact presumed.
"If the inference of the one from proof
is arbitrary because of lack of connection
between the two in common experience" the
presumption cannot be sustained. ~·
supra at 466.
The plaintiff-appellant's brief relies on statistics
taken nearly 40 years ago in a Michigan poll which evidence
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that in only 4.4% of all parking violations, "the violation
was committed by some person other than the owner or an
immediate member of his family."
of the Appellant.

See pg. 5 of the Brief

In other words, in all but 4.4% of the

violations, the registered owner or a member of his family
committed the violation.

Although the appellant does not

expressly conclude that a presumption is valid which holds
the registered owner liable for misdeeds committed by
relatives, the inference is there.

To infer that the

registered owner of an automobile is responsible for the
conduct of a relative who illegally parks a car is totally
spurious and such an inference denies the registered owner
due process of law.

There is already in existence a statute

on the subject of criminal responsibility for the conduct
of another and it reads as follows:
Criminal responsibility for direct
commission of offense or for conduct of
another.--Every person, acting with the
mental state required for the commission
of an offense who directly commits the
offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another
person to engage in conduct which constitutes
an offense shall be criminally liable as a
party for such conduct. Utah Code Ann.,
§76-2-202, as amended, 1973.
The above statute explicitly requires intent to commit or
intent that another commit the conduct constituting the
offense.

The City of Salt Lake, by applying the common-

law presumption, infers that a registered owner has the
requisite mens rea.

This inference is false and as such,
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invalidates the presumption which rests upon the false
inference.
The presumption also lacks effect as applied to
corporations.

First, the corporation has no feet, cannot

drive, is unable to park, but can be the registered owner
of a vehicle.

Second, there is already in existence a

statute governing the criminal culpability of a corporation
and it reads as follows:
Criminal responsibility of corporation
or association.--(1)
A corporation or
association is guilty of an offense when:
(a)
The conduct constituting the offense
consists of an omission to discharge a specific
duty of affirmative performance imposed on
corporations or associations by law; or
(b)
The conduct constituting the
offense is authorized, solicited, requested,
commanded, or undertaken, performed, or
recklessly tolerated by the board of directors
or by a high managerial agent acting within
the scope of his employment and in behalf of
the corporation or association. Utah Code
Ann., §76-2-204, as amended, 1973.
Sub-paragraph (a) of the above statute does not apply to
the case at bar.

Sub-paragraph (b) does apply and requires

intent to commit or intent that another commit the conduct
constituting the offense.

Once again, the City's use of

the presumption rule rests upon a false inference that
automobile registration carries with it an assumption of
legal and criminal responsibility for the misconduct of
others.

The inference is, once again, spurious and as

the inference falls, so must the presumption rule fall.
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...
A corollary to the Tot test is that the presumption
must be more than a regulation of order of proof based
upon the relative accessibility of evidence to prosecution
and defense.
"Nor can the fact that the defendant
has the better means of information, standing
alone, justify the creation of a presumption.
In every criminal case, the defendant has at
least an equal familiarity with the facts and
in most a greater familiarity with them than
the prosecutor.
It might, therefore, be
argued that to place upon all defendants in
criminal cases the burden of going forward
with the evidence would be proper. But the
argument proves too much.
If it were sound,
the [Court] might validly [find] that mere
proof of the identity of the accused should
create a presumption of the existence of all
the facts essential to guilt. This is not
permissible." McFarland v. American Sugar
Mfg. Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86.
The City of Salt Lake is predicating guilt of
a parking violation on the mere identity of the registered
owner of the automobile.

For the City to create such a

presumption based on the accessibility of evidence to
the defendant is impermissible.
Moreover, using the presumption rule to ease the
prosecutor's burden of proof is an arbitrary use of the
presumption and often has been described as "first aid"
to the prosecutor.

See Chamberlain, Presumptions as

First Aid to the District Attorney, 14 A.B.A.J. 287.
"Once the thumbscrew and the
[resulting] confession made conviction
easy; but that method was crude and, I
suppose, now would be declared unlawful
on some ground.
Hereafter, presumption
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is to lighten the burden of the prosecutor
The victim will be spared the trouble of ·
confessing and will go to his cell without
mutilation or disquieting outcry." Casey
v. U.S., 276 U.S. 413, 420 (dissenting--=opinion).
More importantly, the Supreme Court of the United
States made it crystal clear that rationality is only the
first hurdle which a presumption must clear.

A

rational

presumption cannot be used to convict a man of a crime if
its effect is to deny him the protection of a constitutional
right.

Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219.

An accused has

a constitutional right to not testify against himself pursuant
to the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment and pursuant to Article 1, Section 12, of the Constitution
of Utah.
The City Ordinance forces the defendant to come
forward and explain why, in his case, the presumption should
not be applied.

This clearly subjects the defendant to an

impermissible compulsion to testify.

If the defendant

refuses to testify, the City uses the defendant's silence
as an acknowledgement of guilt.
Using a defendant's silence as evide~ce
against him is one way of having him testify
against himself.
Scott v. California, 364
U.S. 471, 472.
Hence, using the silence of a defendant as
evidence against him violates the Fifth Amendment.

"It

the defendant's '
has long been the rule in Federal Courts that
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failure to testify ought not to be even the subject of
unfavorable comment, "United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S.
63 at 72, 73,

(J.

Douglas dissenting opinion}

(1965}

let alone a tacit admission of guilt.
CONCLUSION
Nasfell, supra, controls the resolution of the
appeal and the presumption rule should be given no legal
vitality and no judicial recognition.
In a criminal case, use of a presumption which
is premised upon an inference of the requisite mens rea
is invalid.

Even supposing the Court could find that the

presumption rule is valid, it can not
of guilt because it lacks proof
intent to commit the crime.

be prima facie evidence

beyond~reasonable

doubt of

The City would ask the Court

to extract a criminal violation from mere automobile
registration.

This is a ludicrous inference and the City

should be precluded from using this presumption rule.
Furthermore, implementing a presumption rule to
ease the prosecutor's burden of proof and forcing the
defendant to rebut the presumption because he has a greater
familiarity with the facts cannot be tolerated in a criminal
case.
Finally, even a rational presumption must succumb
to a valid assertion of a constitutionally protected right.
If the effect of a presumption is to deny a defendant
his Fifth Amendment right to not testify against himself,

~en the
presumption must fall.
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For all of the foregoing reasons, the defendantrespondent asks this Court to affirm the decision of the
lower court and to invalidate the use by the appellant of
the conunon-law presumption as evidence establishing guilt
in parking violations.
Respectfully submitted,

D. Gilbert Athay
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